My research focuses on the intersection of emotion and reason, with particular attention to how our experiencing emotions can be rational or irrational (or even a-rational), and how they contribute to our moral and political lives. I draw from meta-ethics, philosophy of psychology, and political philosophy to develop my pluralistic account of reasons for emotions, which emphasizes both their fittingness and their pragmatic roles in individual and social contexts.
Areas of Specialization (AOS): Emotion and Reason; Meta-Ethics; Moral Emotion; Free Will and Responsibility; Social and Political Emotion
Areas of Interest (AOI): Philosophy of Action; Inner Speech; Slurs; Moral Education; Philosophy of Teaching; Ethics of Artificial Intelligence
Work in Progress
My current work on whether pragmatic considerations count as genuine reasons for emotions
(under review)
This paper challenges the common view that only "fitting reasons" can justify emotions. I argue that pragmatic considerations-such as the benefits or costs of feeling a certain way-can also count as genuine normative reasons for emotions. I respond to three main objections: that emotions cannot be generated by pragmatic reasons, that such reasons apply only to wanting or trying to feel, and that only object-related reasons are genuine. Against these claims, I defend the normative significance of pragmatic reasons for emotions.
Rational Inquiry on Trauma
(under review)
Traumatic emotions, such as deep sorrow, intense fear, surprise, or anger, have often been viewed as a-rational or always irrational. This paper challenges the idea that traumatic emotions are neither a-rational nor inherently irrational. I argue that these emotions can be rational, and that experiencing them is not necessarily a sign of weakness but can be grounded in reasons.
Freedom through Talking to Yourself: Inner Speech and Frankfurtian Free Will
(under review)
This paper argues that inner speech is essential for Harry Frankfurt's account of freedom of the will. I show that the capacity to form second-order volitions requires metacognitive reflection, and that such reflection fundamentally depends on our language, specifically, inner speech. This highlights a deep connection between language and autonomy.
Ambivalence as Balance: Fitting and Pragmatic Reasons in Mixed Emotional Affect
(in preparation)
Ambivalent or mixed emotions—emotions with conflicting valences, such as bittersweet grief or pride mingled with guilt—have been negatively evaluated philosophically and psychologically. This paper reinterprets emotional ambivalence not as irrational conflict, but as a balance between fitting and pragmatic reasons. I propose a normative bivariate model of emotional rationality that explains how mixed emotions can be rational responses to complex situations.